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UID:pretalx-balccon2k26-2026-AKXHPM@cfp.balccon.org
DTSTART;TZID=CET:20260918T190000
DTEND;TZID=CET:20260918T194500
DESCRIPTION:Electronic lockers are everywhere - offices\, gyms\, hotels\, h
 ospitals\, co-working spaces. You choose a PIN\, toss in your stuff\, and 
 trust that it's safe. The same goes for electronic safes in hotel rooms an
 d offices. But what does the lock actually do with your PIN? Turns out\, i
 t remembers it. And not very carefully.\n\nWe demonstrate how someone with
  access to a single open locker or safe can extract credentials\, clone ma
 nager keys\, and open every lock in an installation using cheap and widely
  available tools. More critically\, we show how harvested PINs open more t
 han just lockers: the same PIN that protects your locker or hotel safe oft
 en unlocks your phone\, your laptop\, and your bank card.\n\nWe discuss wh
 y reusing a PIN across devices is a terrible idea\, how RFID credentials s
 tored in locks can be used to open doors they were never meant to open\, a
 nd whether vendors have actually fixed anything since we first told them a
 bout these issues.\n\nIf you've ever chosen the same PIN for your locker\,
  your safe\, and your phone - this talk is for you.
DTSTAMP:20260901T064450Z
LOCATION:Tesla
SUMMARY:Your Lock(er) Knows Your PIN ... And So Do I - Dennis Giese
URL:https://cfp.balccon.org/balccon2k26-2026/talk/AKXHPM/
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